This study explores the significance of firm-specific, country, and macroeconomic factors in explaining variation in leverage using a sample of banks from Turkish banking sector. The analysis is based on quarterly firm-level data from Turkish banking sector in 2002-2012. We aims to contribute to the empirical capital structure literature in the following ways. Our first contribution comes from assessing the importance of firm-specific factors, country-level factors and industrial factors for capital structure decisions in Turkish banking sector. Second, we employ appropriate and advanced dynamic panel data estimators, Blundell and Bond's (1998) generalized methods of moment's estimators (GMM System). We find that leverage is significantly and positively associated with average industry leverage, firm size and GDP growth. We find also that leverage is significantly and negatively associated with tangibility, profitability, inflation and financial risk. The regression results for leverage are both theoretically and empirically plausible for banks in Turkey. Moreover, tangibility, profitability and GDP growth are consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory, while firm size is consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory. Our findings suggest that the capital structures of financial and non-financial firms are ultimately determined by the same drivers.
al. (2008) and Brewer et al. (2008) observe that the levels of bank capital are much higher than the regulatory minimum. Banks may be optimising their capital structure, possibly much like non-financial firms, which would relegate capital requirements to second order importance (Gropp and Heider, 2010:590) . Flannery (1994) , Myers and Rajan (1998) , Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Allen et al. (2011) country and macroeconomic determinants of capital structure is a subject of attention. This paper aims to contribute to the knowledge of capital structure by examining the determinants of capital structure across a large panel of banks and by focusing on both the characteristics of the bank and macroeconomic factors. In this article, we contribute to the empirical capital structure literature in the following ways. Our first contribution comes from assessing the importance of country-level factor for capital structure decisions and evaluating the relative importance of the country-specific factors in determining a firm's leverage compared with the firm-specific factors and industrial factors in Turkish banking sector. Second, we employ appropriate and advanced dynamic panel data estimators, Blundell and Bond's (1998) generalized methods of moment's estimators (System GMM, to estimate the determinants of capital structure.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we provide an overview of the related research and capital structure theories. In Section 3 we introduce the data and the estimation methodology. Section 4 contains the results, followed by a concluding section.
CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES

AND
DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Concerning firm-level determinants of leverage, two main theoretical approaches are particularly important: the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. These offer several predictions regarding to firmspecific and country-specific factors affecting firm leverage.
According to the trade-off theory, capital structure choices are determined by a trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) . Classic arguments for this trade-off are based on bankruptcy costs, tax benefits, and agency costs related to asset substitution (Myers, 1977) , and overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) . Each firm has a valuemaximizing target leverage ratio that it strives to reach (Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011) . As a result, although increased leverage mitigates the agency costs of equity, it exacerbates bondholder-shareholder conflicts (Drobetz et al, 2013) .
The pecking order theory (also referred to as the information asymmetry theory), developed by and , argues that the adverse selection costs of issuing risky securities, because of either asymmetric information or managerial optimism (Heaton, 2002) , lead to a preference ranking over financing sources by creating a wedge between internal and external financing costs and by increasing the difficulty of issuing securities. To minimize adverse selection costs, firms first issue internal funds, debt, and then equity (Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011) . There is no concept of target capital structure for a firm in the pecking order theory. The explanation provided by Myers for the pecking order theory is based on the assumption that firm insiders have more information than outsiders (Chakroborty, 2010) . The pecking order theory ranks financing sources according to the degree they are affected by information asymmetry. As a result, firms use internal funds in the first place. If they need external funds, they prefer to issue debt over equity (Drobetz et al, 2013:4) . In contrast with the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory does not predict that firms have well-defined target leverage (Dang, 2013) .
These theories, in contrast to Modigliani and Miller's (1958) assumption of a perfect market, suggest that several factors may determine firm leverage, either firm-internal or firm-external. A particular factor might be positive or negative depending on the theoretical lens. 
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Firm-Level Determinants
Among the firm-level determinants of capital structure, we discuss profitability, size and tangibility.
Profitability
There is no consensus regarding the influence of profitability on capital structure. According to the pecking order theory, firms use internal sources of financing first and then go for external sources of financing. Firms with higher profitability will prefer internal financing to debt and hence a negative relationship is expected between profitability and leverage. Most empirical studies confirm the pecking order theory (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Chakraborty, 2010; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Joeveer, 2013; Chakraborty, 2013; Dang, 2013) .
While profitability is frequently treated as a capital structure determinant, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) propose a more direct approach to test the pecking order,
contrarily to the studies that show evidence that pecking order does not hold (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Leary and Roberts, 2010) . According to the trade-off theory, more profitable firms are supposed to have more debt-serving capacity and more taxable income to shield. Therefore, according to this theory, when firms are profitable they are likely to prefer debt to other sources in order to benefit from the tax shield. (Chakraborty, 2010 
Tangibility
Asset tangibility is a measure for the level of a firm's collateralizable value. From a trade-off perspective, one expects that firms with a higher ratio of fixed-to-total assets are subject to lower costs of financial distress, as tangible assets suffer from a smaller loss of value in case of bankruptcy. In addition, tangible assets are easier to value for outsiders, resulting in lower information asymmetry, less pronounced agency costs of debt, and a higher debt capacity. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage (Drobetz et al, 2013) . However, the pecking order theory predicts that firms with less collateral face higher information costs and, thus, prefers debt to equity.
In other words, collateral and target leverage are negatively related (Dang, 2013) . Some studies report a significant positive relationship between tangibility and total debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Delcoure, 2007; Chakraborty, 2010; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Dang, 2013) . Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Chen (2004) 
Firm Size
The effect of firm size on leverage is ambiguous. Larger firms tend to be more diversified and, thus, less prone to bankruptcy. Also, larger firms have better access to credit markets compared to smaller firms.
In addition, larger firms have more diluted ownership leading to less control over managerial decisions (Delcoure, 2007) . Larger firms with less asymmetric information problems should tend to have more equity than debt and hence have lower leverage (Chakroborty, 2010) . The larger firms face lower information costs and can raise equity capital more easily than the small firms.
Therefore, in the presence of asymmetric information, firm size and target leverage may have a negative relation. Following the pecking order theory of capital structure, it is expected that the size of the firm will be negatively related to leverage. On the other hand, the trade-off theory suggests that large firms face lower financial distress and agency costs and, thus, are able to borrow more than small firms (Dang, 2013) . The implication follows that firm size has a positive effect on target leverage. Some studies find positive relationship between firm sizes and leverage (Booth et al., 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Huang and Song, 2006; Delcoure, 2007; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Lim, 2012;  Dr. Nuri Baltacı, Dr. Hasan Ayaydın P a g e |50| Emerging Markets Journal Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Joeveer, 2013; Dang, 2013) , others observe that firm size is negatively related to leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chakraborty, 2010; Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; Chakraborty, 2013) . A positive relationship between firm Size and leverage would confirm the trade-off theory and a negative relationship would confirm the pecking order.
Country and Macroeconomic
Determinants
A remaining question is whether capital structure is driven by underlying macroeconomic factors which influence firms' capital raising and induce them to choose different levels of leverage at different points (Erel et al., 2012) . The business cycle can affect financing choices and leverage ratios. The demand-forcapital mechanism is based on changes in information asymmetry between firms and investors over the business cycle. If the adverse selection costs associated with information asymmetry are negatively related to the business cycle, poor macroeconomic conditions will induce firms to issue less information-sensitive securities.
Therefore, they tend to use less equity and more debt (Drobetz et al, 2013) . The conjecture that macroeconomic conditions affect firms' ability to raise capital seems particularly important for the banking industry that is affected by current financial crises around the world.
Hence, we added model of the study country and macroeconomic determinants of capital structure.
Following Ferson and Harvey (1994) , De Jong et al (2008), we use inflation rate, GDP growth rate in order to control for the effects of countries economic conditions on capital structure.
GDP Growth Rate
Joeveer (2013) suggests that macroeconomic conditions may affect the leverage through the fact that they proxy the growth opportunities in the overall economy. Since equity financing is less common in Eastern Europe the investment opportunities will be mostly financed by debt and therefore they would expect GDP growth to be positively related to leverage (Joeveer, 2013) and GDP growth has been found to be positively related to leverage. Therefore, GDP growth rate indicates growth opportunities in the overall economy. That is, it is can be evaluated that GDP growth contexts the pecking order theory and trade-off theory.
Firms with higher growth opportunities would need more fund. According to the pecking order theory, there will be stronger preference for external financing, especially for debt (Chakraborty, 2010) . The pecking order hypothesis predicts that firms with higher growth opportunities indicate the greater demand of capital, thus external fund is preferred through debt financing (Lim, 2012) . Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
Inflation Rate
Inflation is one of the main indicators of a country's stability. An increase in inflation rate brings about uncertainty in economic situation. This uncertainty causes firms' inability to repay their debts. Higher inflation decreases the benefits of leverage because of higher bankruptcy costs of debt imposed on firms (Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011) . In this case, lenders demand a higher return for the risk they undertake. Higher interest rate increases firm's cost of debt expected, firms reduce debt ratios. In addition, in periods with higher inflation, firms use currently weak dollars to repay debt and lower their leverage ratios (Drobetz et al, 2013) . Therefore, inflation has a negative effect on leverage. Joeveer (2012) maintains that expected inflation is predicted to be positively related to Drobetz et al (2013) and Joeveer (2013) find negative relationship between inflation and leverage.
Financial Risk
The overall aim of the financial risk rating is to provide a means of assessing a country's ability to pay its way. In essence, this requires a system of measuring a country's ability to finance its official, commercial, and analyze the influence of financial risk on firm leverage using the financial risk index from ICRG.
Average industry leverage
Studies on capital structure often employ dummy variables to control the effect of industry on leverage. It would be reasonable to suppose that specific characteristics of a given industry could also influence the firm capital structure. Therefore, following Joeveer 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Prior research has examined the factors that determine leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Goyal, 2005, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2001 Hovakimian et al., , 2011 .
We follow the existing literature on the selection of the firm-specific factors affecting leverage but also incorporate country-specific macroeconomic factors that are theoretically important in a firm's determination of leverage (Cook and Tang, 2010; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) . The lack of country-specific variability in their study, however, means that they are unable to measure macroeconomic factors, which is the focus of the present paper.
The dynamic panel model in Eq. (1), (2), (3) and (4) requires instruments for the endogenous transformed lagged dependent variable (Baltagi, 2001) and other potentially endogenous explanatory variables.
We use Blundell and Bond's (1998) Table 1 ; we get similar pictures for the industry leverage from the two alternative measures. Size variable is a value between "0.7 "and "8.2". Financial risk index value is changed "27.5" and "36.5" and the average value of its is "32.4". Table 3 Robust SEs of coefficients is reported in parentheses.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
*, ** and *** indicate the coefficient significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
The coefficient on average industry leverage is positive and statistically significant meaning that specific characteristics of a given industry influence the firm capital structure. This finding is consistent with the previous empirical evidence (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2009; Flannery, 2012 and Joeveer, 2013) .
The results for Turkey banks show that leverage is significantly and positively associated with firm size. This finding is consistent with the trade-off theory that large firms face lower financial distress and agency costs and, thus, are able to borrow more than small firms. Empirically, this finding is consistent with the previous empirical evidence (e.g. Booth et al., 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Huang and Song, 2006; Delcoure, 2007; Antoniou et al., 2008; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Lim, 2012; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Joeveer, 2013; Dang, 2013) , Tangibility enters with negative and significant signs in the LEV1 and LEV2 regression. The negative influence of tangibility suggests that the collateral aspect of fixed assets is an important leverage driver for the countries in our sample. This finding is consistent with Dr. Nuri Baltacı, Dr. Hasan Ayaydın P a g e |54| Emerging Markets Journal Volume 3 No 3 (2014 ) | ISSN 2158 -8708 (online) | DOI 10.5195/emaj.2014 the pecking order theory view that firms with less collateral face higher information costs and, thus, prefers debt to equity. Empirically, our finding is consistent with previous empirical evidence (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Brooth et al., 2001; Huang and Song, 2006; Antoniou et al., 2008; De Jong et al., 2008 , Joeveer, 2013 Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; and Chakraborty, 2013 ).
The coefficient on profitability is negative and statistically significant meaning that the more profitable firms are likely to have less debt. This finding appears to be most consistent with the pecking order theory's prediction that firms with large profits and sufficient retained earnings are less likely to rely on debt financing.
Empirically, our results are in line with the welldocumented international evidence on the relation between leverage and profitability (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Chakraborty, 2010; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Joeveer, 2013; Chakraborty, 2013; Dang, 2013) .
GDP growth has positive signs in both leverage regressions. This finding appears to be consistent with the pecking order theory's prediction that firms with higher growth opportunities would need more fund and that firms with higher growth opportunities indicate the greater demand of capital, thus external fund is preferred through debt financing. Our finding is consistent with previous empirical evidence (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011 and Drobetz et al, 2013) The inflation and financial risk index have negative signs in both leverage regressions confirming the predictions. The negative influence of inflation suggests that an increase in inflation rate brings about uncertainty in economic situation. This uncertainty causes firms' inability to repay their debts. Higher inflation decreases the benefits of leverage because of higher bankruptcy costs of debt imposed on firms.
Lenders demand a higher return for the risk they undertake. Higher interest rate increases firm's cost of debt expected, firms reduce debt ratios. Our results are in line with the international evidence on the relation between leverage and inflation (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimoviç, 1999; Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011; Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; Drobetz et al, 2013; and Joeveer, 2013) .
In sum, the regression results for leverage are both theoretically and empirically plausible for banks in Turkey. Moreover, tangibility, profitability and GDP growth are consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory, while firm size is consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study the importance of firmspecific, country and macroeconomic factors for 
